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Foucault and Habermas [The Cambridge Campanion to Foucault, 2nd Edition] 
- David Ingram 10/25/04 Filename: Foucaultnew.wpd 
 
 
I confess a deep reluctance to commenting on Foucault in light of his astute observation that commentaries only “say 
what has already been said and repeat tirelessly what was nevertheless never said."i How much truer this is when the 
commentator proposes to repeat an earlier commentary, as I propose to do here.ii 
  The vanity of my undertaking will hopefully be offset by the modesty of my aim:  to revisit the debate 
between  Foucault and Habermas in order to dispel the notion that they are engaged in incompatible rather than 
complementary acts of social critique. Accepted wisdom has it that Foucault is an anti-humanist who rejects the 
emancipatory ideals of the Enlightenment. Habermas, by contrast, is portrayed as the arch defender of those ideals. 
Again, “common knowledge” holds that Foucault is a historical relativist with strong “anarchist” leanings, while 
Habermas is a “transcendental” philosopher in the Kantian vein engaged in rationally deducing universal and 
necessary norms. 
  In truth, both are humanists - despite their divergent takes on the philosophical coherence of humanism. Both 
readily accede to the value of such things as rights and democratic institutions in shaping and protecting modern 
critical aptitudes, and both accept the ambivalent nature of rights and democratic institutions in simultaneously 
constraining and enabling individual acts of non-conformism and resistance. Where they principally differ is on their 
choice of priorities: Foucault can be understood as a modern-day virtue ethicist fighting to liberate the capacity of 
individual self-choice and personal self-formation from oppressive conformism while Habermas can be seen as a 
political theorist concerned with justifying and promoting a more just conception of democracy based upon an ethics 
of discourse.  
 To be sure, Foucault and Habermas seem to differ quite strongly on whether philosophical humanism is 
necessary for motivating critical practice in some deep “theoretical” sense, and they also seem to disagree on whether 
philosophical humanism is even coherent. But here too I shall argue that the difference between them is largely one of 
perception. Foucault and Habermas agree that humanism forces us to think of human agency in terms of dualistic 
categories of reflection; they just assess this situation differently. Whereas Foucault sees humanism as an ambivalent 
force of self-empowerment that excludes as much as it includes and constrains as much as it emancipates, Habermas 
sees it as an instantiation of dialogical openness that is unconditionally liberating.  
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 Before proceeding further it is advisable to acknowledge up front that any discussion of Foucault and 
Habermas must confront the messy fact that their own thinking about critical theory underwent fairly drastic changes 
over a period of twenty-odd years.   Here I am again reminded of Foucault’s own admonition to those who would 
aspire to be his critics: "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same. Leave it to our bureaucrats and 
police to see that our papers are in order" (AK, 17).  While I'm afraid I cannot grant him this last request, I do so with 
the knowledge that none of us who thinks himself or herself a critical theorist - including Foucault - has ever 
succeeded in resisting the urge to police the limits of what can and cannot be said. Having conceded that,  I will limit 
my policing by focusing mainly  on his and Habermas’s  most mature writings, in which both reclaim the legacy of 
Kant and the Enlightenment against each other.iii 
             After briefly discussing Foucault’s initial reservations about Enlightenment humanism, I will turn to 
Habermas’s defense of the same. Following this initial exchange, I  propose to examine their respective “theories” of 
social and - above all - critical practice.  The standard view held by most commentators is that Habermas situates 
critical practice in consensus-oriented communicative action unconstrained by power, while Foucault situates critical 
practice in strategic action that is importantly conditioned by power. I argue that this view is grossly misleading. What 
Habermas means by “communicative action” must incorporate something like “strategic action” in Foucault’s sense of 
the term; conversely, what Foucault means by “strategic action” must incorporate something like what Habermas 
means by “communicative interaction.” I conclude my commentary by arguing that the two sorts of critical 
theory/practice put forward by Habermas and Foucault are  complementary rather than antagonistic.     
  
The Critique of Humanism in Marx and Nietzsche 
 
 The proper place to begin our discussion is with humanism, since it is around this elusive concept that so 
much of the debate between Habermas and Foucault  seems to revolve. To that end, a brief reprise of the 
quintessentially ambivalent reception of humanism among their philosophical progenitors  - especially Marx and 
Nietzsche – seems appropriate.  Humanism - or the notion that there exists a universal moral core common to 
humanity - is the very substance and soul of modern enlightenment.iv Against all parochial narrow-mindedness and 
tyranny, it celebrates the inherent freedom and equality of all persons, and charts an unwavering course toward 
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complete and total emancipation.  Since Rousseau, critical theorists have continued to sing its praises. But not without 
reservation. Although Rousseau extolled the higher freedom that comes with obeying the universal law of reason,  he 
rued the calculated egoism unleashed by the rational dissolution of social bonds. Hegel (like Burke) later pilloried 
Rousseau’s own defense of sentimental individualism in his withering critique of the “Rights of Man and of Citizen,” 
whose abstraction from social convention he thought paved the way for the terrorist excesses of the French 
Revolution. Then there is  Marx. Even while opposing Feuerbachian humanism to capitalism,  the young Marx 
rejected human rights (political emancipation) as symptomatic of this very same dehumanization. True emancipation, 
he reasoned, will only come with the revolutionary establishment of communism, which abolishes private property. 
This having been accomplished, conflicts between egoistic individuals will gradually disappear - along with rights that 
are needed to protect them from each other. 
 Within barely a  few years of penning his critique of human rights, Marx would come to rephrase the 
emancipatory aims of humanism in a way that would cast doubt on humanism itself.  Leaving aside his premature 
speculations about the world-historical mission of the proletariat as a truly universal class encompassing the 
oppression of all other classes, what remains in his later thought is the utter rejection of idealism in any form and the 
complete embrace of historical relativism.  For the mature Marx, humanity is an unreal abstraction that masks real 
conflicts between  economic classes that have essentially antagonistic interests and share nothing of importance in 
common. That is why  Marx eschews utopian socialist appeals to human decency in  galvanizing revolutionary action. 
Sounding more and more like Bentham, he never ceases to remind us how useless  such vapid notions as  human rights 
are in adjudicating conflicts over property and other matters of distributive justice. And buying into moral abstractions 
can be risky for other reasons as well, not the least being that they can be interpreted in ways that are entirely 
compatible with the status quo. As Marx pointed out, because human rights are by nature abstract, the justice and 
equality they serve to protect is likewise abstract, permitting extreme inequalities in their actual exercise.  
 Admittedly, my all-to-brief summary of Marx’s anti-humanism fails to do justice to his irrepressible faith in 
the inevitability of progress, understood precisely in terms of universal human fulfillment. It is therefore hardly 
surprising that it is Nietzsche, not Marx, who is today regarded as the real founder of modern anti-humanism. 
Sounding like an apostate of Feuerbach and the young Marx,  Nietzsche sees in humanism nothing more than a secular 
version of theism, with all its freedom- and life-denying implications. Even that great paean to freedom and life - 
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human rights - is for him nothing but a sly invention on the part of the weak to constrain the vital, creative powers of 
the strong. As Nietzsche so eloquently put it in the Genealogy of Morals: “What an enormous price man had to pay for 
reason, seriousness, and control over his emotions - those grand human prerogatives and cultural showpieces! How 
much blood and horror lies behind all good things!”v 
 Thanks to Freud and the Frankfurt School, subsequent generations of critical theorists would make 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the modern soul - that “wild beast hurling itself against the bars of its cage”vi - the centerpiece 
of their own critique of “rationalized society,” as Weber understood it. It is thus not without reason that Adorno and 
Horkheimer would later cite the recurring motifs of Nietzsche’s genealogy - the relationship between exchange and 
justice as equivalence-retribution-revenge and the erection of rational autonomy on the ruins of a guilty and repressed 
“conscience” - in building their case against enlightenment.vii  
 But we really owe it to Foucault - who admittedly took his lead from Nietzsche and not from the Frankfurt 
School viii- for having so adroitly exposed the ambivalent effects of this humanistic discourse. 
According to him, humanism promises emancipation at the cost of imposing uniformity and 
excluding those who don’t fit the mold of a genuine human being. Its universal scope,  which at first 
seems so progressive in marking for emancipation women, persons of non-European descent, and the 
working poor who formerly had been denied their humanity, actually works by subjecting all persons 
to the hegemonic regimen and discipline of a single, universal code of behavior. Here, reason - 
conceived as the faculty of universal moral commandments - supposedly dictates clear and precise 
norms that are susceptible of being administered to a subjugated population in a scientifically 
rigorous manner by an elite body of technocrats. Corresponding to this regime of knowledge and 
power we find a parallel universe of self-discovery and self-control instituted within each individual,  
which insures that one's innermost identity as a desiring subject, truly revealed and confessed, will 
happily synchronize with the innermost identities of other similarly self-constituted subjects. In this 
way a generalized will to power, thoroughly decentralized, disseminated, internalized and 
individualized in countless contexts by means of diverse micro-technologies, succeeds in generating 
that anodyne feeling of freedom and solidarity that earlier social contractarians like Rousseau would 
have imagined possible only through more coercive, juridical means. 
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Foucault’s Critique of Humanism 
 
It is precisely at this juncture where Foucault’s difference from Habermas seems most glaring. 
Habermas, after all, regards his own discourse ethics as the proper heir to Rousseauian social 
contractarianism.  He thus fancies himself an arch defender of human rights and democracy. But 
Foucault clearly doesn’t. And the reasons – all having to do with the frailties of humanism – recall 
the sordid uses to which these ideals have been put. 
 First, there are the empirical arguments against humanism. Like Marx, Foucault regards 
humanism as a contingent phase in Western history that is on the verge of surpassing itself, along 
with the notion of the sovereign state as the centralized locus of legitimate power. Before there was 
humanism there was  absolutism, which  was embedded within an entirely different economy and an 
entirely different  paradigm of knowledge and power. After humanism, there will be the “death of 
Man,” or rather the dissolution of “the subject” into preconditioned habits and reactive responses, in 
which concepts like “reason,” “consciousness,” and “rights” as humanism understands them will 
cease to exist.     
  Now,  Foucault’s famous treatment of this shift in Discipline and Punish  (1975) draws 
heavily from his archaeological study of  knowledge paradigms (epistemes) developed in The Order 
of Things (1966).  Until  the mid-seventeenth century, knowledge and truth were conceived 
analogically; knowing something involved tracing its metaphorical and metonymical relationships to 
other things. According to this model, the sovereign ruler was virtually identified with his kingdom, 
and his power was in some sense viewed in terms that were analogous to God’s power over his 
Kingdom, which is to say that it was absolute, unlimited, and in need of no other legitimation. Any 
law-breaking was thus regarded as a kind of personal affront, literally a violation of the sovereign's 
own  bodily integrity. Punishment - which often took the form of public torture and disfigurement - 
therefore served as a ritual, symbolic restoration and re-integration of  the monarch's power at the 
expense of the victim’s dismemberment (DP ,  49-56).  Furthermore, since merely being suspected of 
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criminal activity by the monarch was considered to be an affront to his person (which was presumed 
to be relatively infallible in its judgment), a suspect was  presumed to be at least partly guilty. Hence, 
torturing the suspect served to expiate his guilt as well as reveal the full truth of his criminal intent. 
Failure to extract a confession did not invalidate the sovereign’s original suspicion, but it did 
exonerate the suspect from any further suspicion of criminality. 
 The important thing to notice here is that it is personal power, divinely and absolutely 
sanctioned, that determines what is right and true - not humanity, which impersonally lends equal 
dignity to each and every individual. The rise of humanism changes all that. With the advent of  the 
classical paradigm of knowledge that emerged in the mid-seventeenth century, we notice a new 
egalitarian spirit. Common sense enables each and every one to represent clearly and distinctly the 
things of nature according to their proper classifications. Applied to the political sphere, common 
sense speaks through the impartial voice of reason - the unique and supreme expression of our 
humanity - and perceives the clear limits of arbitrary  power in the natural rights of ‘Man.’  
Henceforth sovereign power will be limited and divided into separate powers,  and it will be exercised 
through the people, whose  interests and powers it represents.  In the age of classical humanism, 
punishment ceases to be personal vengeance and is instead rethought contractually, as the repayment 
of a debt that is owed to humanity at large. But respecting the dignity and autonomy of the criminal 
as one who is rationally accountable for his crime requires extracting this debt in a way that does not 
do violence to his rational, moral nature. Imprisonment, based upon a precise calculus of social harm 
and responsibility, thus replaced torture at the end of the classical period. If anything remained of the 
public spectacle, it was the labor-gangs who 'represented' the moral fault of their criminal idleness 
in their hard work and passive confinement. 
 The theme of labor anticipates the refiguration of sovereign power and punishment according 
to yet another - more modern - humanism. The emergence of capitalism had already rendered the 
premodern dismemberment and destruction of the body costly. The laboring power of the criminal’s 
body was something to be preserved, strengthened and disciplined. The classical, retributive model 
of punishment - based upon the contractarian idea of repaying past debts - did not yet capture the 
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utilitarian need to rehabilitate the criminal as a future, productive member of society. Beginning in 
the nineteenth century, we thus see punishment serving newer and different ends. No longer is one 
punished according to what one did (a discrete and quantifiable act capable of definite 
representation) but according to what one might do, based upon a psychiatric examination of one's 
infinitely malleable and reformable character. In short, punishment increasingly has as its aim the 
disciplining of the body as a source of productivity;  and discipline, as a softer and less visible - albeit 
more global - form of punishment, has as its aim the training of a pliant, productive population (DP .  
24). ix 
 The new humanism sees knowledge and truth as produced ,  rather than represented, by 
humanity. Since Kant, German idealists had insisted that humanity transcendentally produces the 
unified world in which it inhabits through its own knowing activity. In the writings of Fichte and 
Hegel, humanity is elevated to Promethean dimensions, as the demiurge that continually recreates 
itself and its world in striving to realize its nature as absolutely free and unlimited.  The 'truth' of the 
new human sciences of psychology and sociology would henceforth consist in furthering this 
apprenticeship in the art of ‘becoming fully human.’ This infinite task of reform is throughout guided 
by an ideal norm of perfection, in comparison to which each and every actual human being is judged 
to be deficient if not deviant.  
 The old humanism sought to represent human nature as it is: essentially limited by the  laws 
of God and nature. This deference to God and nature designates its own limitations as humanism: 
freedom is simultaneously a gift and  a necessity imposed upon us whether we like it or not; it is not 
something that we give to ourselves. Old humanism’s defense of freedom is thus inherently 
conservative: to preserve and protect the natural freedom of the individual against the power of the 
state. The new humanism does away with this opposition. Far from suppressing freedom,  
governmental power rather seeks to cultivate and tame it for productive ends.  Freedom - or universal 
human fulfilment - becomes the new goal of social progress,  whose revolutionary embodiment is the 
“pastoral” state. 
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 As depicted in Foucault’s writings, the reality of this state is quite the opposite of what it 
seems. If humanity is something made, it is not made with rational foresight and consciousness. The 
same applies to the state: it too is the product of many fortuitous events, not all  of them reconcilable.  
Classical humanism vested the legitimacy and sovereignty of the state in its representation of a 
pre-existing unity: the general and harmonious will of a united people. Modern humanism sees things 
differently: the state produces this will out of itself. But the truth of the matter is that there is no 
supreme will,  people,  subject, or humanity that is guiding this process; and so there is no common 
humanity being produced. What remains, at the core, are mainly decentralized processes of 
conditioning and resistance: action and reaction, biopower.  From the highest echelons of impersonal 
bureaucratic administration down to the lowest levels of personal self-management, power and 
agency remain divided and dispersed.   The illusion that someone is in control is no doubt aided and 
abetted by all the micro-techniques of macro- and micro-management that the human sciences 
proliferate - statistics,   archives, metrics, classification schemes, exams, therapies, and disciplines - 
for use in  detaining, surveying, conditioning, partitioning and “governing” discrete and irreducibly 
diverse  populations. But these processes feed off of - and in turn incite - the very reactions they seek 
to control.  So there is no sovereign power and no common humanity striving to embody it; only  
context-specific relations of force and counter-force that well up inside us in the form of conditioned 
responses and partially controlled and calculated reactions.    
 There is, then, no reality to which “Humanity” refers. From a truly enlightened and 
“scientific” point of view, it would be altogether more accurate to say that there are no 
self-determining subjects strictu  sensu ,  only social force fields traversed by the material effects of 
labor, language, and desire. But Foucault finds humanism logically incoherent in ways that are 
potentially terrifying, as well. The classical paradigm conceived humanism in terms of a dualistic 
ontology. Universal humanity here designates an unconditioned immaterial “substance” - reason, or  
“soul” - which stands opposed to the particular  embodied person, with all i ts determining passions 
and limitations. Corresponding to this ontological dualism we find an epistemological one: the 
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knowing subject - which is again conceived as the rational subject - stands opposed to an independent 
object, which it seeks to represent.  
 Dualism proves to be the downfall of this paradigm. Simply put, it is impossible to 
understand how an object can be represented to a subject that is separated from it by such an immense 
gulf. The problem is magnified further when that object happens to be humanity itself, which - as 
Kant would later argue - cannot even be thought as an object in the strict sense of the term. Hence 
Kant’s attempt to embed humanity in a more modern - and if you will, more humanistic - paradigm 
of knowledge. The epistemological dualism between subject and object is overcome once the human 
subject - or more precisely, a universal transcendental subject - is postulated as constituting 
objectivity by applying its own universal categories of reasoning to passive sensation.  The rest is 
history. Kant’s epigones in the German Idealist tradition successively eliminate the “pre-critical” 
residues of Kant’s humanism -specifically his postulation of a “thing-in-itself” that stands in for the 
unknowable causal source of sensation - thereby rendering humanity epistemologically and 
ontologically absolute.  
 But there remains something odd about this solution. Humanity is postulated as both the 
totality of reality and  knowledge and its original creative source.  “Man” is the term we use to 
designate each and every finite concrete individual as well as the term we use to designate the 
universal Spirit that both inhabits and transcends the individual.  This “transcendental-empirical 
doublet,” as Foucault refers to it (OT,  318). has not really expunged the dualism of subject and 
object, universal and particular. I t has only declared the two sides of the equation to be 
commensurable because one side cannot be thought without the other. Transferred to a discussion of 
rights,  the identification of humanity or universal reason, conceived as the unconditioned legislator,  
and the individual embodied person, understood as the legal subject, appears patently paradoxical. 
How  (to rephrase Rousseau’s query) can one be obligated to oneself? How can the effect (end) be 
identical to the origin (cause)? In short, how can one be God? 
 Dialectical paradoxes like these pose a real danger. Who, after all, is humanity and, more 
importantly, who in particular speaks for it? Locke, Rousseau, and Kant - the founders of the modern 
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idea of human rights - defined humanity to suit themselves, and by so doing consigned women, wage 
laborers, and persons of non-European descent to the status of partial humans. But the danger here of 
confusing a general attribute with any one of its particular instances is unavoidable, since humanity 
and the rights that properly accrue to it will  remain empty and meaningless - without definition - 
unless they are spoken for by someone.  Conversely, once spoken for and declared, the rights of 
“Man” - no matter how parochially interpreted to suit the needs of just certain “men” - will take on 
the dubious ideological status of a timeless and universal   truth. Henceforth, women and people of 
non-European descent will have their humanity measured by the extent to which they have 
“disciplined” themselves to become like men of European descent.  The only proper antidote to this 
oppressive mystification  is to deconstruct the idea of humanity by deploying the same 
“philosophical-historical” practice as that engaged in by Nietzsche, Marx, and the early members of 
the Frankfurt School.  In the words of Foucault: 
 
  .  .  .  the question is being raised: “what, therefore, am I,” I who belong to this 
humanity, perhaps to this piece of it, at this point in time, at this instant of humanity 
which is subjected to the power of truth in general and truths in particular? The first  
characteristic of this philosophical-historical practice, if you will, is to desubjectify 
the philosophical question by way of historical contents, to liberate historical 
contents by examining the effects of power whose truth affects them and from which 
they supposedly derive.x 
    
            The deconstruction of humanism suggested here announces a form of critique and 
enlightenment that seems far removed from if not opposed to the concept of critique and 
enlightenment advocated by Habermas. Speaking of Habermas, Foucault says that the aim of critique 
should not be to “identify general principles of reality” - such as humanity or some other 
transcendental, universal ground - from which “what is true or false, founded or unfounded, real or 
illusory, scientific or ideological, legitimate or abusive” can be known  (WC,  200-01). Its aim should 
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rather  be  the genealogical tracing of the “conditions for the appearance of a singularity born of 
multiple determining elements of which it is not the product but the effect” (WC,  203). In other 
words, genuine critique should be less concerned about its own truth or untruth and more concerned 
about clarifying - in some imperfect and unavoidably partial way - the peculiar historical conditions 
in which it operates.  
 
Habermas’s Response to Foucault  
 
              But can we criticize and resist these peculiar historical conditions without the aid of 
humanism and its sacred rights? There was a time when Foucault thought so: "if one wants to look for 
a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary powers,  
it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of 
a new form of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from 
the principle of sovereignty" (PK,  108).   
            Habermas’s response to Foucault can be understood as an attempt to fulfill at least part of 
this aspiration. Although he doubts whether any anti-disciplinarian right can be formulated that 
doesn’t appeal to human rights, he does think that humanism and its sacred rights can be “liberated 
from the principle of sovereignty” (or,  as Habermas puts it, the principle of “subject-centered 
reason”).  In other words, Habermas thinks that Enlightenment humanism can be interpreted in ways 
that avoid the philosophical paradoxes adduced by Foucault. Furthermore, Habermas thinks his 
explanation shows not only why humanism is still alive and kicking - as a factual force within 
post-subject-centered society - but also why it designates a relatively permanent disposition toward 
emancipation within all human society.  
           As for the “normalizing” features of disciplinary society that both he and Foucault criticize, 
Habermas locates their cause not in philosophical humanism, but in certain “social pathologies” 
associated with class societies and, more specifically, of late capitalism. xi Like Foucault, Habermas 
deplores the extent to which dividing practices and hierarchies of knowledge undermine persons’ 
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critical aptitudes. The intensive division of intellectual and manual labor  and the splitting-off of 
specialized forms of technical expertise, he notes, all too easily lend themselves to centralized, 
top-down management, routinization and normalization,  conformity, and rigid discipline. He shares 
Foucault 's conviction that governmental paternalism in dispensing social welfare robs citizens of  
their freedom, dignity, and individuality. But that is precisely the point. Were it not for the vitality 
of humanism, would persons even complain of their dehumanization? Would  parents and teachers 
resist the bureaucratization of schools? Would  social workers and clients,  nurses, doctors, and 
patients, resist  the bureaucratization of their health and welfare  (PDM, 287)? And what about 
Foucault ’s defense of the rights of prisoners, homosexuals, and mental patients (PDM, 290)? Last but not 
least, could the author of “Confronting Governments: Human Rights” (1984)  have written these words 
sincerely if he had not been a humanist? 
 
There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its duties, and that obliges 
one to speak out against every abuse of power, whoever its author, whoever its victims. 
After all, we are all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged to 
show solidarity.xii 
 
 Habermas suspects that Foucault’s yearning for  “new  rights” is really nothing more than  a 
yearning for a less problematic philosophical paradigm in which to formulate the old human rights. In any 
case, the “crypto-normativity” of Foucault’s rhetorically charged genealogies (as Nancy Fraser puts it) 
shows that Foucault is not the “happy positivist” he claimed to be.xiii I f  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  F o u c a u l t  i s  
a  k i n d  o f  h u m a n i s t  a f t e r  a l l ,  w e  s h a l l  h a v e  t o  t u r n  t o  H a b e r m a s  i n  o r d e r  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  w h y .    
 L e t ’ s  b e g i n  w i t h  H a b e r m a s ’ s  a t t e m p t  t o  r e i n t e r p r e t  m o d e r n  h u m a n i s m  i n  a  w a y  t h a t  
m a k e s  n o  r e f e r e n c e  t o  t h a t  s o v e r e i g n  s u p e r - s u b j e c t ,  h u m a n i t y .  T h e  r e a d e r  w i l l  r e c a l l  t h a t  
t h i s  n o t i o n  i m p l i e s  b o t h  a n  e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  a n d  a n  o n t o l o g i c a l  d u a l i s m  t h a t  i s  a s  
d a n g e r o u s  a s  i t  i s  i n c o h e r e n t .  T h i s  d u a l i s m  c a n  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  m a n y  w a y s .  O n  o n e  h a n d ,  
i t  d e n o t e s  a  s u b j e c t  t h a t  k n o w s  a n  o b j e c t  o n l y  b y  s u p e r i m p o s i n g  i t s  o wn  u n i t a r y  i d e n t i t y  
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o n  i t .  O n t o l o g i c a l l y ,  i t  d e n o t e s  a  t r a n s c e n d e n t  -  u n i v e r s a l  a n d  u n c o n d i t i o n e d  -  g r o u n d  o f  
a g e n c y  t h a t  c o n d i t i o n s  t h e  a c t i v i t y  o f  i n d i v i d u a l  e m b o d i e d  s u b j e c t s .  T h i s  s u p e r - s e n s i b l e  
g r o u n d  -  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  R e a s o n  -  d e v e l o p s  a n d  p r o g r e s s i v e l y  r e a l i z e s  
i t s  e s s e n t i a l  f r e e d o m  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  h i s t o r y .   I n  a l l  t h e s e  i n s t a n c e s ,   h u m a n i t y  a p p e a r s   
a s  a  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  i d e n t i t y  o f  o p p o s i t e s .   M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  f r o m  R o u s s e a u  o n ,  t h i s  
p h i l o s o p h i c a l  ( o r  c o n c e p t u a l )  d i a l e c t i c  i s  t h o u g h t  t o  u n d e r l i e  a  r e a l  p r a c t i c a l  o n e :  t h e  
s o - c a l l e d  “ D i a l e c t i c  o f  E n l i g h t e n m e n t . ”  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h i s  d i a l e c t i c ,  h u m a n i s m  i s  
i n h e r e n t l y  a m b i v a l e n t .  H i s t o r i c a l  p r o g r e s s  i n  e n l i g h t e n m e n t  a n d  e m a n c i p a t i o n  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  a p p e a r s  a s  h i s t o r i c a l  r e g r e s s i o n  t o  m y t h i c  f a t a l i s m .  M o d e r n i s t s  l i k e  M a r x  
a n d  N i e t z s c h e  r e s p o n d  t o  t h i s  d i a l e c t i c  b y  p r o j e c t i n g  a  g o o d  o u t c o m e  i n  t h e  e n d  
( “ c o m m u n i s m , ”  t h e  “ e n d  o f  m a n , ”  e t c . ) ;  a n t i - m o d e r n i s t s  l i k e  H e i d e g g e r  d o  s o  b y  
n o s t a l g i c a l l y  r e c o v e r i n g  ( i f  o n l y  i n  “ p o e t i c  t h i n k i n g ” )  a  p r e l a p s a r i a n  o r i g i n  u n s u l l i e d  b y  
m e t a p h y s i c a l  “ M a n . ”   
 N o w,  H a b e r m a s  p r o p o s e s  t o  d i s s o l v e  t h i s  d i a l e c t i c  b y  r e - f o u n d i n g  t h e  i d i o m  o f  
h u m a n  r i g h t s  o n  a  n e w  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  p a r a d i g m :  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .  P r i o r  t o  t h e  l i n g u i s t i c  
t u r n  -  a n d  m o r e  p r e c i s e l y ,  p r i o r  t o  t h e  p r a g m a t i s t  l i n g u i s t i c  t u r n  i n a u g u r a t e d  b y  t h e  l a t e  
W i t t g e n s t e i n  -  p h i l o s o p h e r s  w e r e  m a i n l y  o b s e s s e d  w i t h  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  k n o w l e d g e ,  w h i c h  
t h e y  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y  i n t e r p r e t e d  i n  C a r t e s i a n  t e r m s .  T h i s  p r o b l e m  b e g i n s  w i t h  a  l o n e  
s u b j e c t  w h o  s e e k s  c e r t a i n t y  r e g a r d i n g  o b j e c t s  i n  t h e  wo r l d  o u t s i d e  o f  i t s  i m m e d i a t e  
s t r e a m  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  S u b j e c t i v e  p a r t i a l i t y  i s  a v o i d e d  a n d  o b j e c t i v e  c e r t a i n t y  
a c h i e v e d  b y  r e c o u r s e  t o   i n n a t e  r e a s o n ,  o r  c o m m o n  s e n s e .  B u t  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  h e r e  w h e r e  
a l l  t h e  p r o b l e m s  o f  c l a s s i c a l  a n d  m o d e r n  h u m a n i s m  b e g i n .  A  b e t t e r  p l a c e  t o  b e g i n ,  
H a b e r m a s  b e l i e v e s ,  i s  w i t h  s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  -  o r  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y .  T h i s  i s  b e c a u s e  
s o c i a l  i n t e r a c t i o n  i s  t h e  f o u n d a t i o n  f o r  b o t h  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  k n o w l e d g e .  W i t h o u t  
s o c i a l i z a t i o n  t h e r e  w o u l d  b e  n o  i n d i v i d u a t i o n  a n d  n o  s u b j e c t s .  A n d  wi t h o u t  p e o p l e  
r a i s i n g  c l a i m s  a b o u t  t h e  w o r l d  t h a t  c a n  b e  c h e c k e d  b y  o t h e r s ,  t h e r e  wo u l d  b e  n o  
k n o w l e d g e ,  n o  “ i m p a r t i a l ”  b e l i e f .  
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 S p e e c h  a c t i o n  ( o r  w h a t  H a b e r m a s  c a l l s  “ c o m m u n i c a t i v e  a c t i o n ” )  i s  t h u s  t h e  
p r i m a r y   m e d i u m  i n  w h i c h  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a n d  k n o wl e d g e  e m e r g e .  U n l i k e  k n o w i n g  s u b j e c t s ,  
s p e a k e r s  d o  n o t  r e l a t e  t o  o n e  a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  m o d e  o f    “ s p e c t a t o r s ”  o b s e r v i n g  o n e  a n o t h e r  
a s  “ o b j e c t s . ”  R a t h e r ,  t h e y   r e l a t e  t o  o n e  a n o t h e r  i n  t h e  m o d e  o f   “ p a r t i c i p a n t s ”  e n g a g e d  
i n  a  p r o c e s s  o f  m u t u a l  e n g a g e m e n t  a n d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  H e r e ,  w h a t  i s  m u t u a l l y  
c o m m u n i c a t e d ,  s h a r e d ,  a n d  a g r e e d  u p o n  -  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e t y  -  t a k e s  p r e c e d e n c e  o v e r   
s u b j e c t i v i t y .  T h i s  m e a n s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  n o  s u b j e c t s ,  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  a b s o l u t e l y  a u t o n o m o u s  
a n d  s e l f - d e t e r m i n i n g  c e n t e r s  o f  a c t i v i t y  -  a n d  n o  h u m a n i t y ,  c o n c e i v e d  a s  t h e  u n i v e r s a l ,  
s o v e r e i g n  g r o u n d  o f  t h a t  a c t i v i t y .   
 
I f  w e  a b a n d o n  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l  f r a m e w o r k  o f  t h e   
p h i l o s o p h y  o f  t h e  s u b j e c t ,  s o v e r e i g n t y  n e e d  n o t  b e  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  t h e  
p e o p l e  i n  a  c o n c r e t i s t i c  m a n n e r  .  .  .  .  T h e  “ s e l f ”  o f  t h e  s e l f - o r g a n i z i n g  l e g a l  
c o m m u n i t y  d i s a p p e a r s  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t l e s s  f o r m s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  t h a t  
r e g u l a t e  t h e  f l o w  o f  d i s c u r s i v e  o p i n i o n -  a n d  w i l l - f o r m a t i o n  w h o s e  f a l l i b l e  
r e s u l t s  e n j o y  t h e  p r e s u m p t i o n  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y .  T h i s  i s  n o t  t o   r e p u d i a t e  t h e  
i n t u i t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h e  i d e a  o f  p o p u l a r  s o v e r e i g n t y  b u t  r a t h e r  t o  
r e - i n t e r p r e t  i t  i n  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e  t e r m s .  xiv 
  
        D e c e n t e r i n g  “ h u m a n i t y ”  i n  t h i s  w a y  d o e s  n o t  m e a n  t h a t  a l l  f o r m s  o f  o n t o l o g i c a l  a n d  
e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l  d u a l i s m  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  t h a t  c o n c e p t  h a v e  b e e n  d i s s o l v e d .   T h e  d u a l i s m  
b e t we e n  t r u t h  a n d  f a l s e h o o d ,   r i g h t  a n d  w r o n g  i s  s t i l l  p r e s e r v e d ,   a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  d u a l i s m  
b e t we e n  i m p a r t i a l  a n d  p a r t i a l ,   r a t i o n a l  a n d  i r r a t i o n a l ,  p e r s p e c t i v e s .   R e t a i n i n g  t h e s e  
d u a l i s m s  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  H a b e r m a s ,  b e c a u s e  s o c i a l  c r i t i c i s m  i s  i m p o s s i b l e  w i t h o u t  t h e m .  
A n d  t h i s ,  p r e c i s e l y ,  i s  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  h u m a n i s m  -  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  a  c o m m o n ,  
i m p a r t i a l  r e f e r e n c e  p o i n t  f r o m  w h i c h  “ w e ”  c a n  a s s e r t  s o m e t h i n g  l i k e  “ h u m a n  r i g h t s . ”  B u t  
t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  h u m a n i s m  a n d  i t s  d u a l i t y  c h a n g e s  o n c e  i t  i s  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  t h e  r e g i s t e r  
 15 
o f  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  a c t i o n .  T h e  d u a l i s m  b e t w e e n  “ i m p a r t i a l  r e a s o n ”  a n d  “ p a r t i a l  b e l i e f , ”  
f o r  i n s t a n c e ,   n o  l o n g e r  d e s i g n a t e s  a  m e t a p h y s i c a l  d u a l i s m  i n t e r n a l  t o  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  
s u b j e c t ,  b u t  r a t h e r  a n  e m p i r i c a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  -  a n d  a  r e l a t i v e  o n e  a t  t h a t  -  b e t w e e n  t wo  
t y p e s  o f   i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e  c o m m u n i c a t i o n :  i n c l u s i v e ,  e g a l i t a r i a n ,  a n d  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  o n  
o n e  s i d e ,   a n d  c l o s e d ,  h i e r a r c h i c a l ,  a n d  c o n s t r a i n e d ,  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  
         N o w w e  a r e  i n  a  b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  h o w  a  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  p a r a d i g m  
m i g h t  a v o i d  t h e  p a r a d o x e s  o f  h u m a n i s m  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  a  s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d  p a r a d i g m .   
 
T h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l - e m p i r i c a l  d o u b l i n g  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  t o  s e l f  i s  o n l y  
u n a v o i d a b l e  s o  l o n g  a s  t h e r e  i s  n o  a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  t h i s  o b s e r v e r - p e r s p e c t i v e ;  
o n l y  t h e n  d o e s  t h e  s u b j e c t  h a v e  t o  v i e w  i t s e l f  a s  t h e  d o m i n a t i n g  c o u n t e r p a r t  
t o  t h e  wo r l d  a s  a  w h o l e  o r  a s  a n  e n t i t y  a p p e a r i n g  w i t h i n  i t .  N o  m e d i a t i o n  i s  
p o s s i b l e  b e t w e e n  t h e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  I  a n d  t h e  i n t r a m u n d a n e  s t a n c e  o f  t h e  
e m p i r i c a l  I .  A s  s o o n  a s  l i n g u i s t i c a l l y  g e n e r a t e d  i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y  g a i n s  
p r i m a c y ,  t h i s  a l t e r n a t i v e  n o  l o n g e r  a p p l i e s .  T h e n  e g o  s t a n d s  w i t h i n  a n  
i n t e r p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h a t  a l l o w s  h i m  t o  r e l a t e  t o  h i m s e l f  a s  a  
p a r t i c i p a n t  i n  a n  i n t e r a c t i o n  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  a l t e r .  A n d  i n d e e d  t h i s  
r e f l e c t i o n  u n d e r t a k e n  f r o m  t h e  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p a r t i c i p a n t  e s c a p e s  t h e  
k i n d  o f  o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n  i n e v i t a b l e  f r o m  t h e  r e f l e x i v e l y  a p p l i e d  p e r s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  o b s e r v e r  ( P D M ,  2 9 7 )  
 
S u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d  h u m a n i s m  e n c o u r a g e s  e a c h  o f  u s  t o  d i v i d e  o u r s e l v e s  i n t o  o p p o s e d  p a r t s :  
o n e  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  ( u n i v e r s a l  h u m a n i t y )  t h e  o t h e r  e m p i r i c a l  ( “ m e ” ) .  “ I ”  b e c o m e  a  “ f r e e ”  
h u m a n  o n l y  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  I  d i r e c t  m y  h i g h e r  r a t i o n a l  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a g a i n s t  m y  l o w e r ,  
e m b o d i e d  s u b j e c t i v i t y ,  a n d  r e f l e c t  u p o n  t h i s  l a t t e r  s y n d r o m e  o f  b o d i l y  d e s i r e s  a n d  
c o n d i t i o n e d  h a b i t s  a s  a  n a t u r a l  o b j e c t  t h a t  c a n  b e  r a t i o n a l l y  c o n t r o l l e d  a n d ,  i f  n e e d  b e ,  
d o m i n a t e d  a n d  r e p r e s s e d .   C o m m u n i c a t i o n - c e n t e r e d  h u m a n i s m ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  p o s t u l a t e s  
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n o  s u c h  d i v i s i o n .  U n d e r  i t ’ s  g u i d a n c e  I  b e c o m e  a  f r e e  h u m a n  b y  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  i n  o p e n ,  
i n c l u s i v e ,  a n d  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  d i s c u s s i o n  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  c o m p a t i b i l i t y  o f  m y  n e e d s  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  o t h e r s .  C r i t i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  i s  “ f r o m  t h e  a n g l e  o f  v i s i o n  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  p e r s o n , ”  
a n d  t h i s  p e r s o n  i s  n o t  a  s u p e r - h u m a n   o b s e r v e r ,  e v a l u a t o r ,  a n d  e x e c u t o r ,  b u t  j u s t  a n o t h e r  
p a r t i a l  p a r t i c i p a n t .  
 T h e  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t h i s  p a r a d i g m  b e c o m e s  r e a d i l y  a p p a r e n t  w h e n  w e  r e c a l l  o u r  
e a r l i e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  d e h u m a n i z a t i o n  a n d  h u m a n  r i g h t s .  H a b e r m a s ,  l i k e  F o u c a u l t ,   s e e s  
d e h u m a n i z a t i o n  a s  a n  o v e r - e x t e n s i o n  o f  s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d  ( o r  i n s t r u m e n t a l )  r e a s o n .  
U n l i k e  F o u c a u l t ,  h o w e v e r ,  h e  a l s o  s e e s  t h i s  o v e r - e x t e n s i o n  a s  a  “ d i s t o r t i o n ”  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i v e  r e a s o n ,  a n d  a  d i s t o r t i o n  m o r e o v e r ,  t h a t  i s  n o t  c a u s e d  b y  s o m e t h i n g  a s  
a b s t r a c t  a s  E n l i g h t e n m e n t  h u m a n i s m ,  b u t  b y  s o m e t h i n g  a s  c o n c r e t e  a s  c a p i t a l i s t  
e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  a n d  i t s  s i d e  e f f e c t s ,  w h i c h  c a l l  f o r  e v e r - g r o w i n g  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
r e g u l a t i o n  o f  e v e r y d a y  l i f e .  
 
  H o r k h e i m e r  a n d  A d o r n o  h a v e ,  l i k e  F o u c a u l t ,  d e s c r i b e d  t h i s  p r o c e s s  o f  a  
s e l f - o v e r b u r d e n i n g  a n d  a  s e l f - r e i f y i n g  s u b j e c t i v i t y  a s  a  w o r l d - h i s t o r i c a l  
p r o c e s s .  B u t  b o t h  s i d e s  m i s s e d  i t s  d e e p e r  i r o n y ,  w h i c h  c o n s i s t s  i n  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  r e a s o n  f i r s t  h a d  t o  b e  r e l e a s e d  i n  t h e  
p a t t e r n s  o f  m o d e r n  l i f e wo r l d s  b e f o r e  t h e  u n f e t t e r e d  i m p e r a t i v e s  o f  t h e  
e c o n o m i c  a n d  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s u b s y s t e m s  c o u l d  r e a c t  b a c k  o n  t h e  v u l n e r a b l e  
p r a c t i c e  o f  e v e r y d a y  l i f e  a n d  c o u l d  t h e r e b y  p r o m o t e  t h e  c o g n i t i v e  
i n s t r u m e n t a l  d i m e n s i o n  t o  d o m i n a t i o n  o v e r  t h e  s u p p r e s s e d  m o m e n t s  o f  
p r a c t i c a l  r e a s o n .  T h e  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  p o t e n t i a l  o f  r e a s o n  h a s  b e e n  
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  d e v e l o p e d  a n d  d i s t o r t e d  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  
m o d e r n i z a t i o n  ( P D M ,  3 1 5 ) .  
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A s  f o r  h u m a n  r i g h t s ,  s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d  h u m a n i s m  e n c o u r a g e s  u s  t o  d i s c o v e r  t h e m  b y  
s i m p l y  t a p p i n g  i n t o  o u r  h i g h e r  r a t i o n a l  h u m a n i t y .  E a c h  o f  u s  d o e s  t h i s  i n  i s o l a t i o n  f r o m  
o t h e r s ,   b y  s i m p l y  g a z i n g  i n w a r d .  O u r  i n n a t e  c o n s c i e n c e  i s  a l l  w e  n e e d  r e l y  o n  i n  k n o w i n g  
w h a t  i s  r i g h t .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  o u r  “ r e a s o n ”  i s  a l l  t o o  o f t e n  c l o u d e d  b y  p e r s o n a l  b i a s .  
E l i m i n a t i n g  b i a s  b y  s t r i v i n g  f o r  e v e r  h i g h e r  l e v e l s  o f  a b s t r a c t i o n  o n  w h i c h  a l l  o u r  r e a s o n s  
c o n v e r g e  l e a v e s  u s  w i t h  n o t h i n g  m o r e  t h a n  e m p t y  p l a t i t u d e s .  W e  m a y  d i s a g r e e  a b o u t  t h e  
r i g h t n e s s  o f  a b o r t i o n  b u t  w h o  c a n  d i s p u t e  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  e v e r y  h u m a n  s h o u l d  h a v e  a  r i g h t  
t o  l i f e  w i t h  h u m a n  d i g n i t y ?   C o m m u n i c a t i o n - c e n t e r e d  h u m a n i s m ,  b y  c o n t r a s t ,  m i t i g a t e s  
b i a s  w i t h o u t  s a c r i f i c i n g  p r e s c r i p t i v e  s p e c i f i c i t y  b y  e n c o u r a g i n g  u s  t o  r e a s o n  t o g e t h e r .  I n  
t h i s  w a y ,  t h e  m e a n i n g  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s  i s  n o t  a b s o l u t e l y  f i x e d  f o r  a l l  t i m e s  a n d  p l a c e s ,  
b u t  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  c o n c r e t e  h i s t o r i c a l  a n d  c o n t e x t u a l  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .  
 H o w f a r  d o e s  t h i s  r e s p o n s e  g o  t o w a r d  a n s w e r i n g  F o u c a u l t ’ s  o b j e c t i o n s  t o  
h u m a n i s m ?  P e r h a p s  n o t  f a r  e n o u g h .  S o m e  c r i t i c s  a r g u e  t h a t   H a b e r m a s ’ s  t h e o r y  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i v e  a c t i o n  h a s  n o t  e n t i r e l y  e s c a p e d  t h e  c l u t c h e s  o f  s u b j e c t - c e n t e r e d  
p h i l o s o p h y . xv A f t e r  a l l ,  h a s n ’ t  H a b e r m a s  h i m s e l f  s a i d  t h a t  i n c l u s i v e n e s s ,  r e c i p r o c i t y ,  a n d  
f r e e d o m  f r o m  c o n s t r a i n t  a r e  n e c e s s a r y ,  u n i v e r s a l  n o r m s  o f  r a t i o n a l  a r g u m e n t a t i o n  
( d i s c o u r s e ) ,  s o  t h a t  a r g u e r s  w h o  r e f u s e  t o  a c k n o w l e d g e  t h e m  a r e ,  i n  e f f e c t ,  c o m m i t t i n g  
a  “ p e r f o r m a t i v e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n ” ?   A n d  d o e s n ’ t  s a y i n g   t h i s  a m o u n t  t o  p o s t u l a t i n g  a  k i n d  
o f  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  s u b j e c t i v i t y ,   i f  o n l y  a s  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  c u l m i n a t i o n  o f  a  l o g i c  o f  m o r a l  
d e v e l o p m e n t  t h a t  s h o u l d  -  b u t   n e e d  n o t  -  b e  h i s t o r i c a l l y  a c t u a l i z e d ?  
 P e r h a p s  n o t  q u i t e ,  i f  w e  a r e  t o  t a k e  H a b e r m a s ’ s  w o r d  f o r  i t .  H a b e r m a s  i n s i s t s  t h a t  
“ c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i s  n e i t h e r  a  u n i t a r y  p r o c e s s  o f  s e l f - g e n e r a t i o n  [ w h e t h e r  o f  t h e  s p i r i t  o r  
o f  t h e  s p e c i e s ] ”   n o r  a n  a l i e n  f a t e  t o  w h i c h  w e  m u s t  s u b m i t .  A l t h o u g h  h e  h i m s e l f  
s u b s c r i b e s  t o  K o h l b e r g ’ s  h y p o t h e s i s  r e g a r d i n g  l o g i c a l  s t a g e s  o f  m o r a l  d e v e l o p m e n t  
( s u i t a b l y  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  s t a g e s  o f  m o r a l  c o m m u n i c a t i o n ) ,  h e  r e m i n d s  u s  t h a t  a c t u a l  
p r o g r e s s  f r o m  s t a g e  t o  s t a g e  i s  c o n t i n g e n t  o n  e x t e r n a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  h e  
r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  “ e v e n  b a s i c  c o n c e p t s  t h a t  a r e  s t a r k l y  u n i v e r s a l i s t  h a v e  a  t e m p o r a l  c o r e ”  
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( P D M ,  3 0 1 ) .  T h e  f r e e d o m  a n d  e q u a l i t y  e n j o y e d  b y  t h e  e i g h t e e n t h - c e n t u r y  s h o p k e e p e r  a r e  
n o t  t h e  s a m e  a s  t h a t  v o u c h s a f e d  t o  p r e s e n t - d a y  c l i e n t s  o f  t h e  m o d e r n  w e l f a r e  s t a t e .  
T h i s  i s  o n e  r e a s o n  w h y  H a b e r m a s ,  u n l i k e  h i s  c o l l e a g u e  K a r l - O t t o  A p e l ,  r e s i s t s  t h e  
t e m p t a t i o n  t o  c l a i m  a n y t h i n g  l i k e  a  s t r o n g  t r a n s c e n d e n t a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  n o r m s  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y .  P u r e  p h i l o s o p h i c a l  r e f l e c t i o n  a n d  c o n c e p t u a l  a n a l y s i s  a l o n e  
c a n n o t  c o n f i r m  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  e x i s t e n c e  a n d  e f f i c a c y  o f  t h e s e  n o r m s  a p a r t  f r o m  s o c i a l  
s c i e n c e .  I t  m a y  w e l l  b e  t h a t  w e  k n o w  o f  n o  o t h e r  w a y  t o  i n t e r p r e t  t h e  n o t i o n  o f  r a t i o n a l  
p e r s u a s i o n  e x c e p t  b y  a p p e a l  t o  t h e s e  n o r m s ;  b u t  t h a t  i s  a t  l e a s t  p a r t l y  a   m a t t e r  o f  
d i s p u t a b l e  f a c t ,  n o t  o f  i n t u i t i v e  c e r t a i n t y .   I n  a n y  c a s e ,   t h e  a c t u a l  m e a n i n g  a n d  f o r c e  o f  
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  n o r m s  i s  a l w a y s  p a r t l y  a n d  p e r h a p s  l a r g e l y  c o n t e x t u a l i z e d  wi t h  r e s p e c t  
t o  a c t u a l  - s p a t i a l l y  a n d  t e m p o r a l l y  d e l i m i t e d  -   p r o c e s s e s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .    T h i s  
a p p l i e s  t o  t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s ,  a s  w e l l .  A s  H a b e r m a s  p o i n t s  o u t ,  e v e n  i f  o n e  
m i g h t  p l a u s i b l y  a r g u e  t h a t  s o m e  h u m a n  r i g h t s  -  s u c h  a s  f r e e d o m  o f  s p e e c h ,  f r e e d o m  o f  
a s s o c i a t i o n ,  a n d  f r e e d o m  o f  c o n s c i e n c e  -  w e r e  i n s t r u m e n t a l l y  j u s t i f i a b l e  a s  n e c e s s a r y  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  t h i s  wo u l d  n o t  a p p l y  t o  a l l  h u m a n  r i g h t s .   A n d  
e v e n  i f  i t  d i d ,  t h e  “ r e a l i z a t i o n  o f  h u m a n  r i g h t s ”  -  t h e i r  p r e c i s e  d e f i n i t i o n  a s  e n f o r c e a b l e ,  
l e g a l  r i g h t s  -  w o u l d  v a r y  d e p e n d i n g  u p o n  t h e  l o c a l  s p e e c h  c o n t e x t s  i n  w h i c h  t h e y  w e r e  
r e c e i v e d . xvi 
H e n c e  H a b e r m a s  t o d a y  i s  m u c h  m o r e  s e n s i t i v e  t o  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t   “ w e ”  w h o  i n t e r p r e t  
r i g h t s  d e s i g n a t e s  a  p l u r a l  a n d  m u l t i c u l t u r a l  n e x u s  o f  m a n y  d i f f e r e n t  i d e n t i t i e s  w h o s e  
b e i n g  i s  n e v e r  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  o r  i d e a l l y  p r e - g i v e n  b u t  i s  a l w a y s   i n  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f   c h a n g i n g  
i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f   h i s t o r i c a l  p o l i t i c a l  s t r u g g l e :  
 
 
 E t h i c a l  d i s c o u r s e s  a i m e d  a t  a c h i e v i n g  a  c o l l e c t i v e  s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g   
 -  d i s c o u r s e s  i n  w h i c h  p a r t i c i p a n t s  a t t e m p t  t o  c l a r i f y  h o w  t h e y  u n d e r s t a n d   
 t h e m s e l v e s   a s  m e m b e r s  o f  a  p a r t i c u l a r  n a t i o n ,   a s  m e m b e r s  o f  a    
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 c o m m u n i t y  o r  s t a t e ,  a s  i n h a b i t a n t s  o f  a  r e g i o n ,  e t c .  w h i c h  t r a d i t i o n s  t h e y   
 w i s h  t o  c u l t i v a t e ,  h o w  t h e y  s h o u l d  t r e a t  e a c h  o t h e r  a s  m i n o r i t i e s ,  a n d   
 m a r g i n a l  g r o u p s .  .  .  c o n s t i t u t e  a n  i m p o r t a n t  p a r t  o f  p o l i t i c s .  B u t  u n d e r   
 c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c u l t u r a l  a n d  s o c i a l  p l u r a l i s m  .  .  . t h e r e  o f t e n  l i e  i n t e r e s t s  a n d   
 v a l u e  o r i e n t a t i o n s  t h a t  a r e  b y  n o  m e a n s  c o n s t i t u t i v e  o f  t h e  i d e n t i t y  o f  t h e   
 p o l i t i c a l  c o m m u n i t y  a s  a  w h o l e .  .  . ( T N M D ,  1 5 6 ) .    
 
F o u c a u l t ’ s  L a t e r  H u m a n i s m  
 
T o wa r d  t h e  e n d  o f  h i s  l i f e  F o u c a u l t  w r y l y  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  “ i n  a  l i t t l e  m o r e  
a g r e e m e n t ”  w i t h  H a b e r m a s  t h a n  H a b e r m a s  w a s  w i t h  h i m .  T h i s  a g r e e m e n t  i s  s t r o n g l y  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  F o u c a u l t ’ s  l a t e r  e m b r a c e  o f  c e r t a i n  h u m a n i s t i c  i d e a l s  o f  t h e  E n l i g h t e n m e n t ,  
i n c l u d i n g  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  t h e r e  m a y  w e l l  e x i s t  t r a n s - h i s t o r i c a l  o r  “ p e r m a n e n t ”  
d i s p o s i t i o n s  a m o n g  a l l  h u m a n s  t o  r e s i s t  g o v e r n m e n t ,  b r o a d l y  c o n c e i v e d .  O n  t h i s  r e a d i n g ,  
u n i v e r s a l  n o r m s  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  s u c h  a s  u n c o n s t r a i n e d  c o n s e n s u s  a n d  r i g h t s  t o  
q u e s t i o n  a r e  c r u c i a l  i d e a l s  t o  d e f e n d .  W e  w o u l d  t h e r e f o r e  b e  we l l  a d v i s e d  t o  s e e  h o w  
F o u c a u l t  r e p h r a s e d  t h e  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  h i s  l a t e r  t h e o r y  w i t h  H a b e r m a s ’ s ,  w h i l e  a t  t h e  
s a m e  t i m e  k e e p i n g  i n  m i n d  h i s  b e l i e f  t h a t  h e  a n d  H a b e r m a s  w e r e  e m b a r k i n g  o n  v e r y  
d i f f e r e n t  c r i t i c a l  p r o j e c t s . xvii 
 The extent to which Foucault’s critical project converges with and diverges from Habermas’s can be 
gleaned from his monumental history of sexuality. The last two volumes of the History of Sexuality published during 
his life marked something of a watershed in Foucault's understanding of his life's work. He now admitted that his 
central preoccupation with humanism (or as he now put it, the “relationship between the subject and truth”)  could 
best be approached by way of a genealogy of ethical self-understanding.  What now occupies center stage in his 
analysis is the way in which persons voluntarily and intentionally subject themselves to technologies of self-control 
- technologies that are embedded in specific practices and types of knowledge determinant of a way of life, a manner 
of self-understanding, an identity - in short, an ethos (UP, 10). 
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 These practices exhibit their own continuity through time. In contrast to Foucault's earlier emphasis on 
epistemological breaks, his genealogical account of the Christian ethos that has shaped the modern age 
acknowledges superficial resemblances between its moral codes and those of its Greek and Greco-Roman 
predecessors. If we think of the moral code as "the set of values and rules of action that are recommended to the 
individual through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies," then all three systems are alike in their 
prescription of sexual abstinence (UP, 2 5). Despite his concession that there were universal constants at play 
traversing the three ethical schemes,  Foucault maintained that there were perhaps deeper rifts embedded in their 
"ethical substance." In other words,  "the way in which the individual has to constitute this or that part of himself as 
the prime material of his moral conduct," might differ historically, despite the superficial commonality in the way in 
which sexuality is talked about. (UP, 26). Some ethical regimes place greater emphasis on the moral code, its 
systematicity and inclusiveness. Here adherence to law is decisive in determining the mode of subjection. Others 
place emphasis on the esthetics of self-transformation. The Christian ethos and especially its modern, secular 
equivalent tend toward the former; the Greek and Greco-Roman ethic, toward the latter (UP, 21, 31).  The difference 
between the three becomes apparent when examining the ethics of sexual abstinence. Whereas the Greek ethos 
sought to cultivate a moderate use of pleasure for the sake of personal and civic virtue, and the Greco-Roman ethos 
sought to cultivate a solicitous care over the self for the sake of rationally administering a complex identity, the 
Christian ethos seeks to cultivate a hermeneutics of desire aimed at discovering the hidden truth of the soul.  Its 
renunciation of a fallen self that is permanently deceived about itself marks the transition to a deontological ethic that 
privileges dutiful obligation to moral law over esthetic self-realization. 
 Now it is well known that Foucault identified his own critical project in terms of the kind of  virtue ethic 
exemplified in these pre-modern ethical orientations. As he put it, “There is something in critique which is akin to 
virtue . . . . [the] critical attitude as virtue in general” (WC, 192). Indeed, this is one the features that seems to 
distinguish his critical project from Habermas’s, which is so concerned with legitimating human rights..  However, it 
would be wrong to liken this  retrieval of an earlier ethical orientation as a “conservative” rejection of modern ethics, 
as Habermas once thought (MP, 354).xviii F o u c a u l t  d i s d a i n e d  t h e  i d e a  o f  r e t u r n i n g  t o  t h e  p a s t .  M o r e  
i m p o r t a n t l y ,  a s  w e  s h a l l  n o w  s e e ,  F o u c a u l t  l a t e r  s i t u a t e d  h i s  p r o j e c t  w i t h i n  t h e  s a m e  
m o d e r n  m o r a l  f r a m e w o r k  s h a r e d  b y  K a n t  a n d  H a b e r m a s .  W h a t  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h i s  
 21 
a m a l g a m a t i o n  o f  t h e  a n c i e n t s  a n d  t h e  m o d e r n s  i s  a  d i s t i n c t i v e l y   “ p o s t m o d e r n ”  v i r t u e  
e t h i c  t h a t  p r i v i l e g e s  t h e  r a d i c a l  f r e e d o m  t o  r e s i s t  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  a s  s u c h .  
 F o u c a u l t  t e l l s  u s ,  i n  f a c t ,  t h a t  t h e  c r i t i c a l  a t t i t u d e  w e  t y p i c a l l y  a s s o c i a t e  w i t h  t h e  
m o d e r n  E n l i g h t e n m e n t  a r i s e s  “ i n  a n y  m o m e n t  o f  h i s t o r y ”  i n  w h i c h  g o v e r n m e n t a l i t y ,  o r  
t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  “ p o we r ,  t r u t h ,  a n d  t h e  s u b j e c t ”  i s  q u e s t i o n e d  ( W C ,  1 9 9 ) .   
F o u c a u l t ’ s   i n v o c a t i o n  o f  a  “ c r i t i c a l  s p i r i t ”  r u n n i n g  t h r o u g h o u t  h u m a n  h i s t o r y  s o u n d s  
v e r y  h u m a n i s t i c ,  a n d  i s  c o n f i r m e d  b y  h i s  v i e w  a b o u t  h u m a n  t h o u g h t  i t s e l f :  
   
  T h o u g h t  .  .  .  c a n  a n d  m u s t  b e  a n a l y z e d  i n  e v e r y  m a n n e r  o f  s p e a k i n g ,  
d o i n g ,  o r  b e h a v i n g  i n  w h i c h  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l  a p p e a r s  a n d  a c t s  a s  s u b j e c t  o f  
l e a r n i n g ,  a s  e t h i c a l  a n d  j u r i d i c a l  s u b j e c t ,  a s  s u b j e c t  c o n s c i o u s  o f  h i m s e l f  
a n d  o t h e r .  I n  t h i s  s e n s e .  t h o u g h t  i s  u n d e r s t o o d  a s  the very form of  action -  as 
act ion insofar as it  implies the play of true and false,  the acceptance or refusal o f 
rules,  the relat ion of onesel f to others. . . .  Posing the question in this way brings into play 
certain altogether general  principles.  Singular forms of experience may perfectly well harbor 
universal structures; they may well not be independent from the concrete determinations of 
social existence ... [t]his thought has a historicity which is proper to it. That it should have this 
historicity does not mean that it is deprived of all universal  form, but instead the putting into play 
of these universal forms is itself historical (FR,  335 - my stress).   
 
 What are these universal structures of human thought  and act ion? Foucault gave different 
answers to this question during his l i fet ime. However,   on occasion he appealed to none other than 
Habermas himself -  specifically Habermas’s theory of knowledge const i tut ive interests  -  in 
arguing that  human nature is motivated by three quasi-transcendental  or ientations, toward:  (a) 
technical or instrumental control of nature,  (b) pract ical communicat ion aimed at mutual 
understanding, and (c) resistence to domination.  According to  Foucault :   
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 power relat ions,  relationships of communicat ion, object ive capacit ies should not 
therefore be confused. This is not to say that there is a quest ion of three separate 
domains. Nor that there is  on one hand the fie ld of things, of perfected technique, 
work,  and the transformation of the real; on the other that of signs, communicat ion, 
reciprocity,  and production of meaning;  final ly that  of the domination of the means 
of constraint ,  of inequality and the act ion of men upon men. I t  is a quest ion of three 
types of relat ionships which in fact a lways over lap one another ,  support one 
another  reciprocally,  and use each other mutually as means to  an end (SP ,  217-18) .   
 
Significantly,  as we saw above, Foucault e lsewhere adds a fourth “transcendental” structure to  
this  constel la t ion of “techniques”: “technologies of the self .”xix The quest ion we must  ask is: Why 
did Foucault feel  compelled to supplement Habermas in this way?  
 To answer this quest ion, we must  look more closely at what  Foucault found problematic in 
Habermas’s theory.   Foucault is especial ly interested in what  Habermas has to say about 
communicat ive act ion and domination (power) .  Foucault seems to accept  Habermas's  general 
character izat ion of consensual  communicat ion as foundational  for the raising of val idity claims 
and the incurr ing of general obligat ions in a modern society. This impression is reinforced by his 
remark that  
 
 in the ser ious play of quest ions and answers,  in the work of reciprocal e lucidat ion,  
the rights of each person are in some sense immanent  in the discussion. . . .  The 
person asking the quest ions is merely exercising the r ight that has been given him:  
to remain unconvinced,  to perceive a contradiction,  to  require information,  to 
emphasize different postulates,  to point out  faulty reasoning (FR,  381).  
 
Elsewhere Foucault takes issue with Habermas's  ideal izat ion of consensual  communicat ion,  
denying that " there could be a state of communication which would be such that the games of t ruth 
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could circulate  freely,  without obstacles,  without constraint and without  coercive effects."  Stated 
bluntly,  Foucault thinks that  Habermas's  assessment of the prescr ipt ive value to  be accorded 
unconstrained consensus is too utopian.  
 
 I t  is being blind to the fact that relat ions of power are not something bad in 
themselves, from which one must  free one 's  self.  I  don't believe there can be a society 
without relations of power, if you understand them as means by which individuals try to conduct, to 
determine the behavior of others. The problem is not of trying to dissolve them in the utopia of a 
perfectly transparent communication, but to give one's self the rules of law, the techniques of 
management, and also the ethics, the ethos, the practice of self, which would allow these games of 
power to be played with a minimum of domination.xx 
        In this passage Foucault hints at why we need to supplement the critique of ideology and, along with it, the 
democratic legitimation of law, with an ethics of virtue based upon “technologies of the self.” Ideology critique and 
democracy are no more immune from the effects of power and domination than any other regime of “knowledge” and 
“legitimation.” The “power- knowledge ” exerted by “expert” critics  - be they  psychoanalysts or critical social 
theorists - and the “power-politics” exerted by democratic majorities must in turn be resisted by the counter-power 
exercised of virtuous subjects. Taken in their own right, none of these forms of power are bad. Indeed, all of them can 
be put to good use. But all of them need to check one another in a balanced play of forces. 
     Just how far this language of strategic gaming can be reconciled with the language of constraint-free mutual 
understanding promoted by Habermas will become apparent shortly. Of course, such a reconciliation would have 
seemed preposterous to Foucault and Habermas. But then again, since neither really understood the other, why should 
we take their opinions as Gospel truth? To take one glaring example, Foucault’s imputation that Habermas is 
advocating a utopian view of constraint-free communication simply contradicts what Habermas himself repeatedly 
said on the subject.  Habermas denied that “perfectly transparent communication” was possible, since we are at most 
capable of reflecting on only a portion of our preconscious, taken-for-granted assumptions at any given time. And he 
denied that the kind of power-free  “ideal speech situation” presumed by speakers engaged in rational argumentation 
was – or even should be – realizable. Indeed, this “counterfactual assumption” is only weakly regulative: it does not 
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enjoin the realization of “ideal speech” - as Habermas never ceases to point out, there are many economic and 
administrative contexts in which engaging in communicative interaction is either inefficient or inappropriate - but at 
best warrants the questioning of any factual consensus as ideological. 
         So Habermas and Foucault both agree that there is no such thing as communication unconditioned by the effects 
of power and that certain forms of power can be productive, positive, enabling, and empowering. That said, there 
remains an important point of contention between Foucault and Habermas: Habermas continues to emphasize the 
value of “truth” or “right” as a hedge against power,  whereas Foucault doesn’t. Like Nietzsche, Foucault is deeply 
skeptical of all knowledge claims. Because knowledge claims are conditioned by historical frames of understanding 
that have been partly constituted and affected by subliminal “power relations,” Foucault wonders what it could 
possibly mean to “justify” (legitimate) a claim as true or valid. In short, in Foucault’s account, all validity claims (as 
Habermas puts it) are necessarily partial, constrained, and illegitimate - even if only somewhat. Hence, for him, 
critique must take the negative form of “de-legitimizing” claims: “all knowledge rests on injustice (there is no right, 
even in the act of knowing, no truth or foundation for truth)” (LCP, 163). 
            I will return to this provocative thesis at the conclusion of my essay, for it suggests why Foucault is more 
attracted to a virtue ethics of personal, existential resistance than he is to deontological ethic based upon impersonal 
rights. Before doing so, however, I would first like to return to a problem I mentioned above regarding the apparent 
tension between Foucault’s description of social interaction as pre-eminently “strategic” and Habermas’s description 
of the same as pre-eminently “consensual.” This little detour will help us understand the extent to which power might 
be productive of “truth” and “right.” Understanding this will in turn shed light on the way in which Foucault regards 
“power” as a kind of quasi-transcendental locus of productivity, a position Habermas criticizes - wrongly I believe - as 
metaphysical.   
    
Power and Action 
 
              In the passage cited above, Foucault asserts that he is following Habermas in claiming that power 
(domination) is a "transcendental" on a par with communicative relationships and instrumental capacities. However, 
in only one of the possible texts to which Foucault might have been referring does Habermas even remotely suggest 
 25 
that power is a transcendental medium of knowledge and action. The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
Habermas often has in mind many different notions of power. In the text cited by Foucault, Knowledge and 
Human Interests (1968),  Habermas suggests that domination (Herrschaf t)  is  not a transcendental , 
or  necessary feature of the human condit ion,  l ike the other  two or ientat ions, but a contingent 
feature associated mainly with class societ ies.  In a somewhat later essay, Habermas closely follows Hannah 
Arendt in opposing power (Macht), conceived as united action based upon voluntary, communication-based consent, 
to domination, or violence aimed at asymmetrical instrumental control.xxi In yet another venue - the  Theory of 
Communicative Action (1981) - Habermas discusses other senses of power associated with what he calls strategic 
“speech acts” and “power-backed” systemic imperatives. Only here could it be said that Habermas accepts the 
“necessity” of power in structuring human relationships. 
       In truth, both Foucault and Habermas regard power as a permanent, if variable, feature of society. For 
Habermas, the manifestations of power, ranging from relatively innocuous forms of subtle influence to overt forms of 
violent domination, vary both structurally and historically. From a structural point of view, power may designate a 
feature of speech action or a mechanism of system integration. As a feature of a speech, it specifies the peculiar 
sanction of authority backing up commands. Although in the Theory of Communicative Action Habermas 
categorically distinguished commands backed by mere threat of force from commands backed by rationally binding 
moral authority, in a more recent reply to critics he conceded that "a continuum obtains between power that is merely 
a matter of factual custom and power transformed into normative authority."xxii Such a continuum is attested to by the 
simple fact that rationally binding moral platitudes such “Tell the truth!” are initially learned as commands backed 
by threat of sanctions.xxiii 
          A similar continuity obtains when power is viewed as a vertical mechanism of systemic 
integration.. xxiv Even prior to the splitting off of autonomous economic and political subsystems, the exercise of 
power in stratified tribal societies, Habermas notes, occurs in the form of personal prestige and influence. 
Importantly, this kind of power need not rely on sanctions. The asymmetrical exercise of power owing to differences 
in lineage, gender, and generation is still interwoven in consensus-oriented communication between persons who, 
morally speaking, remain mutually accountable to one another. Today, this same burden falls on technical experts, 
despite their monopoly on the power of expertise. By contrast, the bureaucratic power exercised in modern 
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organizations depends on impersonal legal sanction. Here the exercise of power is largely relieved of the above 
burden. I say “largely” because, for Habermas, the exercise of  administrative power still requires democratic 
legitimation, which occurs within the medium of consensus-oriented communication.  Although the government relies 
upon legal coercion - not negotiation - in exacting compliance, this strategic medium remains subject to judicial and 
public oversight (Reply, 254-58). 
         In a manner that invites comparison with Habermas’s taxonomy, some of Foucault’s late interviews also 
distinguish between levels, or degrees, of power, domination, and governance.xxv Whereas domination involves 
unilaterally exercising uncontested power over others, governance - even between unequals - involves some reciprocal 
give and take.xxvi  S t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  l i k e  t h i s  c a n  e v e n  b e  p e r f e c t l y  r e c i p r o c a l .  I n d e e d ,  
t h e  m o s t  s t r i k i n g  t h i n g  a b o u t  F o u c a u l t ’ s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  e x e r c i s e d  p o w e r  i s  
t h a t  h e  d o e s  n o t  o p p o s e  s u c h  p o w e r  t o  c o n s e n s u s - o r i e n t e d  c o m m u n i c a t i o n .   
         H a b e r m a s ’ s  t e n d e n c y  t o  d o  j u s t  t h e  o p p o s i t e  p a r t l y  r e f l e c t s  h i s  s o m e w h a t  
i d i o s y n c r a t i c  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n .  A s  H a b e r m a s  u n d e r s t a n d s  i t ,  s t r a t e g i c  
a c t i o n  o c c u r s  w h e n e v e r  o n e  o r  m o r e  a c t o r s  p u r s u e  p e r s o n a l  a i m s  b y  i n f l u e n c i n g  t h e  
b e h a v i o r  o f  o t h e r s  t h r o u g h  t h r e a t  o f  f o r c e ,  c o v e r t  m a n i p u l a t i o n ,  o r  s o m e  o t h e r  
i n s t r u m e n t a l  i n d u c e m e n t .  O f t e n  t h i s  r e q u i r e s  c o n c e a l i n g  a  s t r a t e g i c  m o t i v e  b e h i n d  a n  
a p p a r e n t l y  o p e n  a n d  c o n s e n s u a l  o n e  ( T C A  I .  1 0 ,  8 5 ,  2 7 3 - 4 ) .  B u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  o n l y  n o t i o n  
o f  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n  H a b e r m a s  h a s  i n  m i n d ,  a s  i s  e v i d e n c e d  b y  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  r h e t o r i c  
a n d  i n d i r e c t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n xxvii.  M o r e  i m p o r t a n t l y ,  i t  i s  n o t  t h e  n o t i o n  t h a t  F o u c a u l t  h a s  
i n  m i n d ,  e i t h e r .   I n d e e d ,  t h e  e g o i s m  a n d  a t o m i s m  t h a t  H a b e r m a s ,  l i k e  m a n y  g a m e  
t h e o r i s t s ,  a t t r i b u t e s  t o  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n  a r e  m u c h  l e s s  p r o n o u n c e d  i n  F o u c a u l t ’ s  a c c o u n t  
o f  s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s ,  s i n c e  h e  r e p u d i a t e s  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  i n d i v i d u a l i s m .  O n  t h e  
c o n t r a r y ,  i f  h i s  n o t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n  c o m p o r t s  w i t h  a n y  m o d e l  o f  g a m e s m a n s h i p ,  i t  
w o u l d  b e  t h e  m o d e l  o f  “ p l a y ”  t h a t  H a n s - G e o r g  G a d a m e r  h a s  a r g u e d  u n d e r l i e s  a l l  f o r m s  
o f  c o n s e n s u a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g . xxviii 
        F o u c a u l t  t e l l s  u s  t h a t  a  s t r a t e g i c  p o w e r  r e l a t i o n  i s  " n o t  s i m p l y  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
b e t we e n  p a r t n e r s ,  i n d i v i d u a l  o r  c o l l e c t i v e ;  i t  i s  a  wa y  i n  w h i c h  c e r t a i n  a c t i o n s  m o d i f y  
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o t h e r s "  ( S P ,  219). This comports with Gadamer’s concept of free play,  in which it is the preconscious subtext of 
the speaker’s utterance (including the perlocutionary,  affective, and rhetorical  force of speech) that draws out and 
elicits a response from the listener. To this extent, subjective agency remains beholden to actions that have a meaning 
(power and efficacy) all their own, independent of consciously intended aims. This is not a relationship of violence, 
but requires "that 'the other' (the one over whom power is exercised) be thoroughly recognized and maintained to the 
very end as a person who acts" (SP, 220). This is to say that "power is less a confrontation between two adversaries 
or the linking of one to the other than a question of government": the structuration of a field of possible responses 
(SP, 221). According to this latter reading, not only are freedom and power not mutually exclusive, but "freedom 
may well appear as the condition for the exercise of power" (SP, 220). Hence the free play of actions and effects is 
not entirely independent of rational agency - it presupposes a real and, as we shall see, legal capacity for initiative and 
counter-initiative - but it is not reducible to it, as Habermas would like to think it is. 
      Speech act theory provides ample confirmation of this interplay of freedom and power. Take the example of 
promising. As Habermas notes, the freedom of the addressee depends on his or her capacity to refuse the promise. 
This offer thus presents an opportunity for exercising freedom; that is, it opens up a field of possible responses on the 
part of the addressee. We might say that, by taking the initiative in opening up a determinate field of possibilities, the 
speaker's offer constitutes a deployment of power whereby the response of the addressee is conducted. This 
conducting, however, is not a manipulating. At best, only a field of possibilities - one that is relatively open - is 
offered up by the speaker. This offer both limits and enables a range of responses, one of which is refusal and 
resistance. The freedom and power of the addressee is conditional for the freedom and power of the speaker and vice 
versa. Promise-making, for instance,  would be meaningless if the addressee had no choice but to accept the offer. 
The free consent of both speaker and addressee is at play here since, as Kant himself famously showed, without the 
assumption of reciprocity that accompanies promise-making, the manipulation of the promise-breaker would never 
succeed. 
           These remarks are important not only because they suggest that strategic reciprocity is prior to strategic 
manipulation, but also because they imply that strategic actors - far from being passive bearers of functional roles and 
internalized norms - actively and freely contribute to  structuring the field of possible responses. Strategic power and 
consensual freedom thus constitute one another, and both are necessary features of social relationships. 
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Critical Practices: The ambivalence of Enlightenment 
 
        What implications does Foucault’s belief in the transcendental necessity of power have for critical practice? In 
his late commentary on Kant’s famous essay of the same title, “What Is Enlightenment?” (1784), Foucault contrasts 
two types of critical practice, both of which he finds implicit within Kant’s philosophy:  
 
Criticism indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question was 
that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the 
critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, 
necessary, obligatory, what is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of 
arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of 
necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression. . . This 
entails the obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for 
formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that 
have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, 
thinking, saying. In that sense criticism is not transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a 
metaphysics possible. . . it will not seek to identify the universal structures of all knowledge or of 
all possible moral action, but it will seek to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we 
think, say, and do as so many historical events. And this critique will be genealogical in the sense 
that it will not deduce from the form of what we are to what it is impossible for us to do and to 
know; but it will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of 
no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are. . . . It is seeking to give new impetus, as far and 
wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom (FR:46). 
 
Let us be very clear about what Foucault is saying here. He is not denying the existence of general conditions that 
both constrain and make possible the peculiar mode of being we commonly associate with modern humanity - that 
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much we have already established. The "universalizing tendencies" he discovers at the root of Western civilization - 
"the acquisition of capabilities and the struggle for freedom" - have constituted, in his opinion, "permanent elements" 
(FR:48). That is why he characterizes "our" freedom has an "ascetic task" of self-production that is both discipline 
and limit. As he puts it, "modernity does not 'liberate man in his own being'; it compels him to face the task of 
producing himself" (FR:42--my emphasis). 
  Yet it is precisely this compulsion to be modern that in Foucault's judgment renders any justification of 
modernity itself problematic. Although one might hypothesize about the conditions that define and limit the modern 
compulsion to be free, one could not claim any transcendental certainty for them. In any case, if the enlightenment is 
part of the "historical ontology of ourselves" that has determined who we are, it would make no sense to be for or 
against it (FR:43). Because it is meaningless to legitimate what is beyond choice, and because there is no 
emancipating knowledge that is not itself inherently partial and conditioned by preconscious effects of power, one 
must remain content to do the one thing that is existentially possible, namely, freely reinterpret and live it in a manner 
that best accords with one's singular understanding of who one is.  
 If Foucault eschews the role of Kantian legislator in favor of playing transgressive critic, it is only because 
he no less than Habermas posits freedom - the compulsion to be free - as a kind of irresistible “limit” on our 
transgressive practice. Or perhaps we should say “enabling condition.”  For, in truth, are not Habermas and Foucault 
describing social structures that, in some sense, both enable and empower  us to resist and question power? Likewise, 
once we accept the notion that all knowledge is itself inherently fallible, might we not say that we “know” - at least in 
some provisional sense that encourages endless disputation and justification - that we are compelled and enabled to 
be free?  And isn’t this all that Habermas means by legitimation? 
 But - you say - Foucault is not Habermas. He has given up the notion that critical resistance must be 
justified. If genealogical critics are called upon to justify their “claims,” they will not do so by offering reasons that 
will be compelling to everyone. Using widely accepted scientific and historical practices need not entail acceptance 
of their deeper truth or impartiality. xxix 
 Habermas finds this insouciant disregard for knowledge-based justification highly paradoxical. How can 
Foucault expect others to take his claims seriously if they are not backed up with justifications supporting their truth 
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and rightness, however contingent and fallible such arguments might be? Anyway, isn’t Foucault contradicting 
himself when he claims to know that there is no knowledge? xxx 
 One way to extricate Foucault from this dilemma is to take seriously his suggestion that critical practice can 
take non-discursive forms.  In the last course he conducted at the College de France in 1984, Foucault talked about a 
different kind of self-justification modeled on the parrhesia practiced by ancient Greek and Roman ethicists.xxxi The 
emphasis here is on producing a "true life" through one's bearing and demeanor.  In Habermas's scheme, such a notion 
of truth-telling is still implicitly discursive insofar as it tacitly raises esthetic-expressive claims to truthfulness 
(Wahrhaftigkeit) and authenticity (Eigentlichkeit).  But even if this were true, the peculiar justification of such 
claims would not be anything like the justification of truth or validity claims. For in this case, Habermas 
concedes,  justification resides almost entirely in conducting oneself  consistently and resolutely.   
 Now, Foucault's interest in parrhesia centers on its exemplifying a non-discursive form of justification in 
precisely this sense. In other words, we might take this to mean that, for Foucault, critique really is nothing more than 
the embodied exemplification of virtuous resistance, “performed” as Judith Butler says, but not rationally justified.xxxii 
But it would be hard to square this assessment with his assertion that consensus remains "a critical idea to maintain at 
all times." Indeed, far from dispensing with discursive reason as a critical tool, Foucault, as we saw,  actually affirms 
the mutual and unavoidable interaction between communicative, strategic, and expressive types of action. According 
to him, one must "ask oneself what proportion of nonconsensuality is implied in such a power relationship, and 
whether the degree of nonconsensuality is necessary or not" so that "one may question every power relationship to that 
extent" (FR, 379).  
              Parrhesia, must itself be reconfigured as a social virtue that also impinges on issues of social justice in which 
the rights of others are at stake.  As such it must combine two distinct critical techniques: one that is aesthetic and 
transgressive and another that is moral and discursive. Transgressive critique resists normative limits. It invents new 
vocabularies for describing who we are and who we want to be as individuals - all new ways of expressing and caring 
for ourselves.  Finally, it elevates to a fine art the "undefined work of freedom that is condemned to creating its 
self-awareness and its norms out of itself" (TAHP, 106). Hence it principally acts upon "bodies and pleasures" rather 
than upon minds and reasons.xxxiii Ideology critique, by contrast, embraces normative limits. Ideals of truth and 
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justice inspire us to seek our own empowerment in concert with others. They compel us to reason together as free and 
equal participants in a democratic form of life. 
         Democratic accountability designates an on-going process of questioning, resisting and dissenting. On this 
point Foucault and Habermas are in perfect agreement. As the passage I cited earlier clearly shows, Foucault no less 
than Habermas appeals to unconstrained dialogue as a standard of critique. Is this not to say that he too accepts the 
practice of legitimation? 
 The burdens of legitimation fall upon persons who are committed to reserving as much freedom for others 
as they reserve for themselves. This kind of freedom would scarcely be imaginable outside of a constitutional 
framework that protects against the intrusive and constraining power of those anonymous systems of surveillance 
and discipline that find their maximum concentration in the state. By the same token, it can be argued that the 
framework itself is in jeopardy when people cease to question its meaning. Each must interpret this framework as a 
realization of both their common humanity and their unique individuality. Humanity and individuality mediate one 
another and both refer to needs and desires. Hence the integrity of a system of rights must depend on the extent to 
which legal subjects have freely cultivated their own aesthetic sensibilities.xxxiv 
 
Alienation, Aesthetics, and The Limits of Ideology Critique 
 Habermas is fond of saying that values interpret our needs; they relate our  physiological and corporal being 
to our spiritual yearning for complete happiness. Freedom and duty do not exhaust our ethos. Ruminating on the 
limits of  a form of social criticism oriented exclusively toward questions of justice and domination, he once asked: 
 Is it possible that one day an emancipated human race could encounter itself within an expanded 
space of discursive formation of will and yet be robbed of the light in which it is capable of 
interpreting its life as something good? The revenge of a culture exploited over millennia for the 
legitimation of domination would then take this form: right at the moment of overcoming age-old 
repressions it would harbor no violence, but it would have no content either. 
 
Social justice - to paraphrase Habermas - is no substitute for social happiness. And here we need to recall that last 
vestige of eudaimonistic Marxism in Habermas’s theory of communicative action. According to Habermas, 
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capitalism necessitates unhappiness. It promotes a selective rationalization in which “one cultural value sphere” - in 
this case, the moral-ethical-aesthetic sphere - “is insufficiently institutionalized without a structure-building effect 
for the whole of society and (at least) one sphere of life” - the economic-administrative sphere - “prevails so far that 
it subordinates other orders of life under its alien form of rationality” (TCA I, 240).  Simply put, capitalism alienates 
us from our lifeworld, in which individual needs are interpreted by shared values that in turn aspire towards a 
felicitous state of harmony. Capitalism has thus “found some functional equivalent or ideology formation,” which 
consists in frustrating this harmonization by  “preventing holistic interpretations from coming into existence” (TCA 
II, 383). 
 Now, there is no other guidepost for determining when our lives have become overly colonized by economy 
and state, overly splinted and fragmented by the hyper-specialization of expertise, and overly alienated from the 
lifeworld except by appeal to value judgments that express our felt sensibility that things are not well with us.  To cite 
Habermas: “if we do not wish to relinquish  altogether standards by which a form of life might be judged to be more 
or less failed, deformed, unhappy, or alienated, we can look to the model of sickness and health” (TCA I, 73-74).  But 
he immediately adds that the “balance among non-self-sufficient moments, [the] equilibrated interplay of the 
cognitive with the moral and aesthetic-practical” implied in this model cannot be derived from “the formal concept of 
freedom which modernity’s decentered understanding of the world has left us.” Unlike justice and emancipation, 
happiness is not directly implicated in the formal structures of the “ideal speech situation.” As such, it is questionable 
whether critical theory ought to speculate about it. Indeed, Habermas goes so far as to suggest that the critique of 
alienation is something that critical theory “must refrain” from doing (TCA II, 383).  
 Of course, Habermas cannot be serious about this. He cannot abandon the critique of alienation - of the 
“colonization of the lifeworld” and of the “splitting of of expert cultures” - without playing into the hands of a system 
that encourages uncritical thinking by “preventing holistic experiences from coming into existence.” So despite 
being rationally ungrounded, the critique of alienation remains both desirable and possible from Habermas’s 
perspective.  Indeed, holistic orientations to collective well-being, happiness, and the good are indispensable for 
other reasons as well. According to Habermas, they provide the necessary complement to his deontological - 
specifically procedural - account of law and democracy. The rights that instantiate procedural ideals of freedom, 
equality, and justice are themselves only realized in the form of enforceable statutes. But the process by which  
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legislatures, administrators, and judges define rights in turn  responds to specific harms and benefits - and broader 
“ethical” conceptions of public well-being - debated  by average citizens.   
 As I noted above, debates about harms and benefits are only possible to the extent that individuals cultivate 
their aesthetic-ethical sensibilities. Part of this cultivation no doubt occurs in rational argumentation about judgments 
of taste.  However, it cannot be reduced to it.xxxv For prior to being discussed, judgments of taste must be cultivated in 
aesthetic experience, which is partly intuitive and affective.  Habermas adds that, “such an experience is used to 
illuminate a life-historical situation and is related to life problems, it . . . not only renews the interpretation of our needs 
in whose light we perceive the world,” but it also “permeates as well our cognitive significations and our normative 
expectations and changes the manner in which all these moments refer to one another. In this respect, modern art 
harbors a utopia that becomes a reality to the degree that the mimetic powers sublimated in a work of art find 
resonance  in the mimetic relations  of a balanced and undistorted intersubjectivity of everyday life” (MP, 353). 
 Talk of art’s “mimetic powers” finding “resonance” in everyday life once again brings us back to Foucault’s  
aesthetic technologies of self-formation. Contrary to what one might expect from the utopian yearnings embedded in 
art, one cannot experience reconciliation alone. It requires an intimate caring for one’s self and one’s consociates in all 
their sensuous singularity. xxxvi  Despite their self-referential nature, technologies of aesthetic self-formation are 
instruments for communicating care. So,  in addition to our metaphysical faith in and humanitarian hope for a better 
life for all, the individualized care and responsibility we extend to  particulars others requires a unique receptivity to 
our own "bodies and pleasures." We learn to care about ourselves from others caring about us and also from our caring 
about them.xxxvii  
 To conclude, the seemingly solitary judgement and phronesis exercised by the transgressive virtue ethicist 
may well complement the collective process of normative legitimation exercised by critics of ideology. Yet the 
difference between the former and the latter still stands - no matter how far one “enlarges” one’s felt sensibilities to 
include others. As Nietzsche wisely observed, it is “selfish to experience one’s own judgment as a universal 
law.”xxxviii(GS, 265). 
  And yet,  in the process of interpreting that law for purposes of social criticism, how can we possibly avoid 
doing what Nietzsche bids us not to do?  As a standard for criticizing injustice, humanity is but an empty receptacle 
that must be filled with our most deeply felt utopian yearnings for happiness. What we know of it is largely what we 
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have made of it. In the age of humanism, that sounds a bit terrifying. We have become the God that we ourselves killed 
– so much so that there is literally nothing left in our own humanity that could withstand the infinite depths of our 
critical reflection. Accordingly, Nietzsche’s lament that he is “all too human” also expresses a joyful paean to the 
“overman” within him whose every affirmation of life is simultaneously an act of Promethean self-nihilation,. 
Likewise for Foucault, this sublime transgression of limits contains an element of the tragic. Perhaps it is this Faustian 
dialectic – so emblematic of the horrors of the last century - that Nietzsche had in mind when he said that we must 
“discover the hero no less than the fool in our passion for knowledge” (GS, 164).  If so, then the tragic “hero” in our 
passion for self-knowledge must be the one who learns to embrace the most enduring and noblest of lies, namely, the 
illusion that there is a humanity and truth worth striving for.   And here I cite Nietzsche one last time:     
 
(T)he question "Why science?" leads back to the moral problem: Why have morality at all when life, nature, 
and history are "not moral"? No doubt, those who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense that is 
presupposed by the faith in science thus affirm another world than the world of life, nature, and history; and 
insofar as they affirm this "other world" - look, must they not by the same token negate its counterpart, this 
world, our world? But you will have gathered what I am driving at, namely, that it is still a metaphysical faith 
upon which our faith in science rests - that even we seekers after knowledge today, we godless 
anti-metaphysicians still take our fire, too, from the flame lit by a faith that is thousands of years old, that 
Christian faith which was also the faith of Plato, that God is the truth, that truth is divine. But what if this 
should become more and more incredible, if nothing should prove to be divine any more unless it were error, 
blindness, the lie - if God himself should prove to be our most enduring lie? (GS, 282-3).         
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o r d e r  t o  c o o r d i n a t e  t h e  p u r s u i t  o f  p e r s o n a l  a i m s .  H e r e ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  o r i e n t a t i o n  t o w a r d  
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d o e s  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  o c c u r .  B u t  H a b e r m a s  a l s o  r e c o g n i z e s  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  b o r d e r l i n e  c a s e s ,  
s u c h  a s  t h e  h o r t a t o r y  r h e t o r i c  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c i a n ,  t h a t  m i x  o r i e n t a t i o n s .  H e r e  t h e  
o r i e n t a t i o n  t o w a r d  r e a c h i n g  m u t u a l  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i s  p u r s u e d  r e s e r v e d l y ,  a t  b e s t  ( 2 9 1 ,  n .  
6 3 ) .  I n  t h i s  r e g a r d  i t  b e a r s  n o t i n g  t h a t  H a b e r m a s  b y  n o  m e a n s  n e g l e c t s  t h e  s u b o r d i n a t i o n  
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o f  s t r a t e g i c  s p e e c h  a c t s  t o  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  a i m s  t h a t  o c c u r s  w h e n e v e r  o n e  " g i v e s  a n o t h e r  
t o  u n d e r s t a n d  s o m e t h i n g "  i n d i r e c t l y .  T h e  o p e n i n g  u p  a n d  p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  c o m m u n i c a t i v e  
i n t e r a c t i o n  o f t e n  d e p e n d s  o n  s u c h  n o n - v e r b a l i z e d  p e r l o c u t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s .  T h e  
u n a n n o u n c e d  p o we r ,  o r  i n d i r e c t  i n f l u e n c e ,  t h a t  s t e m s  f r o m  t h e  ( r e l a t i v e l y  i n d e p e n d e n t )  
m e a n i n g  o f  t h e  s p e e c h  a c t  a n d / o r  i t s  c o n t e x t  o f  d e p l o y m e n t  c a n n o t  b e  c o n c e i v e d  m e r e l y  
a s  a  s t r a t e g i c  a c c r e t i o n  i n  t h e  n a r r o w  s e n s e ,  a s  H a b e r m a s  o n c e  t h o u g h t .  R a t h e r ,  i t  
c o n s t i t u t e s ,  a s  h e  h i m s e l f  n o w  r e a l i z e s ,  a n  i n d i r e c t  c o m m u n i c a t i o n  i n  i t s  r i g h t ,  o n e  t h a t  
i s  p e r h a p s  b e s t  c a p t u r e d  b y  t h e  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  n o t i o n  o f  s t r a t e g i c  a c t i o n  a l l u d e d  t o  b y  
F o u c a u l t  ( 2 3 9 f f . ) .  
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J - F .  L y o t a r d  h a s  r e c e n t l y  e m p h a s i z e d  t h e  a g o n i s t i c  ( o r  c o n t e s t a t o r y )  n a t u r e  o f  l a n g u a g e  
g a m e s .  A l t h o u g h  F o u c a u l t  o f t e n  f o r m u l a t e s  h i s  t h e o r y  o f  s t r a t e g i c  r e l a t i o n s  i n  
c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l  t e r m s ,  h i s  r e m a r k s  a b o u t  p r e s e r v i n g  t h e  f r e e d o m  o f  t h e  o t h e r  w i t h o u t  
d o m i n a t i n g  h i m  ( s e e  b e l o w)  s u g g e s t  a  m o r e  G a d a m e r i a n  p h r a s i n g .  S e e  H . - G .  G a d a m e r ,  
T r u t h  a n d  M e t h o d  ( C o n t i n u u m ,  1 9 8 6 ) ,  9 1 - 1 1 9 ;  J . - F .  L y o t a r d ,  T h e  P o s t m o d e r n  C o n d i t i o n :  
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I n t e r n a t i o n a l  7 : 3 / 4  ( W i n t e r  1 9 8 7 /  8 8 ) : 2 8 4 - 3 0 3 .  
 
xxix
. Hubert Dreyfus argues that abandoning the kind of theoretical holism that Quine, Davidson, Habermas, and 
Gadamer hold  - the view that the meaning of action can be captured in terms of non-context-specific true or false 
beliefs - in favor of the practical holism of Heidegger's Vorhabe, Bourdieu's habitus, or Foucault's 
pre-discursive practices, enables us to circumvent the need for justification and along with it, the debate between 
relativists and universalists. However, Dreyfus’s concern about theoretical holism is baseless, since it rests on a 
confusion, to wit: that  transcendental enabling conditions like praxical and communicative competencies are like 
linguistic contents, which delimit meaning. Reducing different language games to limiting - as opposed to enabling - 
conditions forces us to conclude that they must be   radically incommensurable, or incapable of being translated 
into each other. But it is precisely the “universal” and “formal” conditions underlying a universal communicative 
competence that enable specific contents from different languages to be translated (however imperfectly) into one 
another. See H. Dreyfus, "Holism and Hermeneutics," Review of Metaphysics 34 (198o):3-23. For a detailed 
argument against strong holism, see J. Bohman, New Philosophy of Social Science (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1991), 115ff. 
 
xxx
.Hoy suggests that  Foucault's post-modernism enables him to avoid the charge of pragmatic contradiction (or 
self-referential paradox) leveled against him by Habermas. As a post-modernist Foucault can both accept the 
inescapability of rational notions of truth and legitimacy - something the anti-modernist can't do - and deny that they 
can (or need) be given any transcendental or teleological justification. Habermas seems to miss this aspect of 
Foucault's position, classifying him as an "anti-modernist" and "young conservative" (one who yearns for the 
"archaic, the spontaneous powers of imagination, of experience and emotionality") who nonetheless departs from a 
modern concept of emancipated subjectivity. See David Hoy, "Foucault: Modern 0r Postmodern?" in After Foucault, 
12 -4 1. 
 
xxxi
. See T. Flynn, “Foucault as Parrhesiast: His Last Course at the College de France (1984),” in Bernauer and 
Rasmussen, The Final Foucault, 102-18. 
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xxxii
. J. Butler, “What Is Critique? An Essay On Foucault’s Virtue,” in  The Political, 212-226. 
 
xxxiii
. Habermas compares Foucault's appeal to a different economy of bodies and pleasures to Georges Bataille's 
appeal to the heterogeneous and Peter Sloterdijk's to the Cynics' bodily-expressive forms of protest, both of  which are 
similar to the parrhesiast’s  truth-telling. The comparison with Bataille seems weak. Bataille’s appeal to 
“sovereignty” actually resonates with Marcuse's critique of repressive desublimation, in that both envisage an 
estheticization of the body and pleasure free of the constraints of genital sexuality. But as Habermas elsewhere 
acknowledges, Foucault himself never tired of rejecting the notion that there existed a "primordial vitality" (or 
"purity of desire") beneath sexual prohibitions. See B.-H. Levy, "Power and Sex: An Interview with Michel 
Foucault," Telos 32 (1977):158; Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced 
Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1964), 56-83; and P. Sloterdijk, Kritik der zynischen Vernunft, 2 vols. (Frankfurt, 
1982). For a critique 0f Foucault's appeal to "a posthumanist political rhetoric of body language" see Nancy Fraser, 
"Foucault's Body Language: A Posthumanist Political Rhetoric?" in Unruly Practices, 55-66. 
 
xxxiv
. Cf. TCA II, 40ff and 57ff., where Habermas appeals to Mead's account of the relationship between "me" and "I" 
to explain the complementarity of moral individuation and autonomy, 0n the one hand, and esthetic selfrealization 
and creativity, on the other. 
 
xxxv
. Foucault's defenders seem to have misunderstood the thrust of Habermas's discourse ethic and its appeal to 
unconstrained consensus. Dreyfus and Rabinow, for example, argue that Habermas's advocacy of enlightenment 
requires replacing phronesis, rhetoric, and art with rational communication that has been purged of all strategic 
power relations - a position that is clearly contrary to his position as I have laid it out here. On a somewhat different 
point, it seems too facile to say, as Habermas and McCarthy do, that Foucault ended up embracing the aesthetic side 
of the enlightenment in opposition to the cognitive and moral sides. See McCarthy (1990):463;  Dreyfus and 
Rabinow, "What Is Maturity? Habermas and Foucault on 'What Is Enlightenment?' " in Hoy, 119-21; J. Habermas, 
Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990 - hereafter MC), 98,133, 175, 195ff; and my "Completing the Project of 
Enlightenment: Habermas on Aesthetic Rationality," New German Critique 53 (Spring/Summer 1991):67-103; and 
Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason (Yale University Press, 1987), 39, 101, 131, 172. 
 
xxxvi
. Cf. Habermas's response to Kohlberg and Gilligan in "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning 
Stage," The Philosophical Forum, vol. XXI, nos. 1-2 (Fall-Winter 1989-90), p. 47.  
  
xxxvii
. Cf. Carol Gilligan,  In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982).  Does a virtue ethic of care and a deontological ethic of  justice designate opposed 
methods of moral deliberation? Or do they designate complementary aspects of a more inclusive and complete 
account of moral deliberation?  I incline toward this latter alternative, and I think Habermas does too. Habermas 
proposes a two-step process of moral deliberation involving the justification of norms followed by their contextual 
application. Both steps involve real or simulated dialogue incorporating the perspectives of generalized and concrete 
other. This position seems to resonate with Gilligan's own views. For, although she distinguishes between social 
concern and intimate caring (p. 155), she shares Habermas's opinion that communicative openness is basic to both (pp. 
29-30). In this context see Seyla Benhabib, "The Utopian Dimension in Communicative Ethics," in Critical Theory: 
The Essential Readings; Habermas's response to Gilligan in MC:175-82, and my discussion of Gilligan, Benhabib, 
and Habermas in Critical Theory and Philosophy, pp. 207-11.  
 
xxxviii
. F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1974), 64; hereafter GS. 
